Abstract This article addresses a particular aspect of EU's external governance: rule selection. Drawing on institutionalist and power-based explanations we put forward an account for the choice of the specific rules that guide policy convergence between the EU and third countries. The proposed analytical framework broadens the scope of the studies examining the externalisation of EU's rules beyond its borders, in that we claim that the EU can promote policy convergence using rules other than the EU's. More specifically, the EU also promotes policy convergence on the basis of international and bilaterallydeveloped rules. These analytical claims for explaining rule selection are checked against empirical data. We compare policy convergence between the EU and four neighbouring countries (Morocco, Ukraine, Georgia, and Russia) in three subfields within foreign and security policy: foreign policy dialogue, control of export of dual-use goods in the context of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and crisis management.
Introduction
The European Union (EU) has set itself the grand objective of bringing neighbouring countries "closer to the European Union in a number of priority fields" (Commission for the European Communities, 2004), thus creating a "ring of friends" with whom to share "everything but institutions" (Prodi, 2002) . There is no shortage of ambition in this approach. Thus it is perhaps not surprising that a great deal of scholarly attention has been paid to what is perceived as a tendency on the part of the EU to extend some of the processes related to enlargement well beyond its territorial confines (Bauer et al. 2007; Bicchi, 2006; Kelley, 2006 , Lavenex, 2004 Lavenex et al. 2008) .
The usual way of depicting the relationship between the EU and its neighbours is as a harmonisation process that should lead to the adoption of EU rules by neighbouring countries. Nevertheless, we will claim that while the Union does encourage its partners to harmonise their policies with the EU in a number of fields, policy convergence can occur on the basis of rules other than EU ones. International and bilaterally-developed rules can also be at the heart of policy harmonisation. As will be argued, the selection of any of these sets of rules can be explained by combining variables drawn from the three analytical approaches outlined in the introduction to this special issue; namely, the institutionalist, power-based, and domestic factors accounts.
In order to make this point, we examine a number of issues related to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP): foreign policy dialogue, control of the export of dual-use items, and crisis management. This is an unusual choice, because the CFSP has normally not been included in the external governance approach 1 . Firstly, given its intergovernmental character, the CFSP would appear to lack the meso-level instruments and processes that foster external governance. However, in the second pillar 3 there are Europeanisation-like dynamics that go well beyond the mere sum of national policies, or their least common denominator (Smith, 2004) . Some of these processes are nearly as old as European foreign policy. The term of 'Brusselisation' (Allen, 1998) has been used to denote that "while the relevant competences do remain ultimately at the disposal of the Member States, the formulation and implementation of policy [is] increasingly Europeanized and Brusselized by functionaries and services housed permanently at Brussels" (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2002: 261) . Besides, the fact that Community resources are needed to develop the CFSP has fostered cross-pillarisation (Stetter, 2007) . Secondly, the CFSP is itself a foreign policy and so would seem to fit uncomfortably with an analytical framework that stresses the external projection of internal arrangements. The rest of this paper will address this claim and argue that the CFSP can be interpreted perfectly well through the lenses of external governance, especially if EU, international, and bilateral rules are included in the analysis.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents (i) a conceptualisation of our dependent variable, rule selection for policy convergence, and
(ii) the independent variables and how they relate to the analytical approaches set out in the introductory chapter to this special issue. Section 3 examines three subfields within the issue area of foreign and security policy (foreign policy dialogue, control of the export of dual-use items, and crisis management) in four neighbouring countries (Georgia, Morocco, Russia, and Ukraine). Section 4 summarizes our findings and presents conclusions about the external governance approach in the domain of foreign and security policies. 4
Conceptualizing rule selection
As argued, we want to account for the patterns of rule selection for policy convergence.
In other words, we are interested in explaining the choice of specific rules as the basis to increase the "similarity between one or more characteristics of a certain policy" in the EU and neighbouring countries (Knill, 2005: 768) .
Two aspects of this approach need to be stressed. First, we talk of policy convergence rather than of the transfer of policies or rules. This is because we think that the notion of policy convergence can better capture the fact that the increasing similarity in policy across different actors might be the result of a more complex interaction than the one-way process that is suggested by the notion of transfer. We see rule selection as the product of the interaction between the EU and third-party countries, either by explicit agreement between both parties or by anticipation on the part of the EU (because the continuous interaction between the EU and its neighbours provides the Union with input on how the latter might regard the possibility of adopting different processes to achieve policy convergence). In sum, either directly or indirectly, neighbouring countries play a critical role in determining which externally promoted rules may be adopted and how.
Second, we claim that the relationship between the EU and its neighbours can be based on rules other than the EU's. While sometimes, the EU creates the standards that it exports (Björkdhal, 2005; Lavenex and Uçarer, 2004) , at other times the policy standards originate elsewhere. In this latter case, the EU and the third actor may work together to set a tailor-made rule, or the EU may act more as a taker/transmitter of rules that have been elaborated in other international fora.
Given the above, the EU and its neighbours can pursue policy convergence in three different ways. (i) They may work towards convergence to EU rules, in which case the neighbouring partner will adopt, in part or in full, the acquis communautaire.
specific aspects of the EU acquis politique, or well-codified rules of a constitutive character that are related to human, social, and economic rights as laid down by the EU.
(ii) They may work towards convergence to international rules, in which case a neighbouring partner will adopt acknowledged international standards as a result of EU facilitation or encouragement. (iii) The EU and neighbouring countries can pursue convergence by developing rules bilaterally.
The question naturally arises of whether there is any pattern behind the selection of EU, international, or bilateral rules as the basis for policy convergence. As presented in the introduction to this special issue, explanations of the effectiveness of external governance can be grouped as follows: (i) the institutionalist account, structured around the degree of legalisation and legitimacy of the EU's rules; (ii) the power-based explanation, which focuses on the EU's bargaining power; and (iii) the domestic factors approach, whose core aspects are the administrative capacity of the target state, the costs of adoption, and veto players, as well as the domestic resonance of EU-promoted rules. For the purpose of our analysis, and given our conceptualisation of the selection of rules for policy convergence, we need to organise the independent variables in a slightly different way. The notion of policy convergence (and its emphasis on the agency of neighbouring countries) requires an understanding of the variables that takes into account their relational and intersubjective character. It requires treating the domestic conditions of the target state as an integral part of the legitimacy of EUpromoted rules (and EU efforts to promote rules), and of the EU's bargaining power vis-à-vis neighbouring states. Thus, we identify two independent variables that broadly 6 coincide with the institutionalist and power-based approaches, while integrating the account that is based on domestic factors.
The first variable, mutual perceptions of legitimacy, stems from the institutionalist account and combines both legalisation and legitimacy concerns. The legalisation bit is most relevant for the transfer of EU rules. Their chances of becoming the standard of policy convergence hinges on the way and the degree to which they are encapsulated in legal statutes. As hypothesized in the introduction to this special issue, "the more that EU rules are legalised, the more likely they will be selected, adopted, and implemented beyond EU borders" (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009 ). In addition, this variable is based on the premiss that actors adopt new rules when they are convinced of their appropriateness (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009) . In other words, given our conceptualisation of policy convergence, we take very much into account the intersubjective character of legitimacy. The resonance between the rules that can shape policy convergence and the normative context in the neighbouring country is thus of critical importance. Finally, perceptions of legitimacy also concern how far the potential adopter of external rules can identify with the actor promoting them and the legitimacy attributed by the third state to the process by which standards for convergence are set.
Legitimacy is hard to measure as decision-makers in neighbouring countries do not usually address this aspect in public. It is all too easy to resort to the observation of preferences, but then the risk is high of conflating independent and dependent variables.
In this paper we measure legitimacy by looking at the behaviour of the third party as conducted independently from the interaction with the EU. More specifically, we identify instances of behaviour that are previous to attempts by the EU to foster policy convergence or that take place either in relation to similar topics or in different settings.
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The second variable, EU bargaining power, stems from the power-based account. The arguments for adopting this variable are quite straightforward: (1) states decide to accommodate externally defined rules by comparing the costs and benefits of different courses of action, and (2) the EU may alter the cost-benefit assessment through incentives and disincentives (if it has enough bargaining power vis-à-vis the neighbouring states). Both the costs and benefits of adopting particular rules depend partially on the administrative capacity of target states. There is a further point to be made here. Neighbouring countries' cost-benefit analyses are likely to include both substantive and process-related considerations. In other words, neighbouring states can be expected to take into account not only the costs and benefits of adopting particular rules per se, but also the effects that any course of action might have on their relationship with the EU. There are two reasons for thinking that the latter can play a particularly relevant role when it comes to the CFSP. First, in the area of foreign policy, actor networks are usually less densely populated; hence, policy convergence is less likely to undermine the interests of veto players that might want to hinder the adoption of rules. Second, foreign policy is a highly visible and relatively unambiguous way of signalling the will to cooperate more closely with the EU.
We claim that change in these two variables explains the selection of rule for policy convergence. From an analytical standpoint, convergence on the basis of EU's rules appears to be the most demanding option, because the EU's rules are normally more detailed and context-bound than international or bilaterally-developed rules;
hence, the costs related to their adoption and the probability that they are seen as intrusive or patronizing by the third-party state will also be higher. Consequently, we expect convergence to be based on the EU's rules only when the two variables have a positive value, i.e. if the EU is able to provide substantial incentives and the rules at 8 issue are perceived as legitimate. When either the legitimacy of the EU's rules or the EU's bargaining power is insufficient, we expect policy convergence to be based on other kinds of rule. More specifically, when the EU's rules are not deemed legitimate, or less legitimate than international alternative rules, we expect international rules to take central stage with respect to policy convergence. Alternatively, if the EU's bargaining power is insufficient, in that the neighbouring state is both uninterested in adopting external rules and powerful enough as to resist EU pressures in the particular issue area at hand, we expect policy convergence to be based on bilaterally-developed rules.
Having presented our analytical claims for explaining rule selection in EU's external governance, we turn in the following section to whether or not the claims are borne out by empirical data. We compare policy convergence between the EU and four neighbouring countries (Morocco, Ukraine, Georgia, and Russia) in three subfields within foreign and security policy. Our analysis proceeds in two steps. In the first step, we identify, on the basis of basic bilateral documents, the rules that govern policy convergence in each case. In the cases of Ukraine, Morocco, and Georgia we look at ENP Action Plans, while in the case of Russia we review the document that established the Four Common Spaces and the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. In the second step, we assess the variables mutual perceptions of legitimacy and EU bargaining power in each case in order to confirm or disconfirm our claims about the patterns of rule selection. The analysis of these variables draws mainly on a closer examination of official documents from the Council and the minutes of relevant bilateral meetings. The results of the case studies are summarised in Table 1 As for Russia, the process of convergence is anchored in international rules. This is mainly explained by the legitimacy that Russia attributes to international law in its self-perception as a global player. Indeed, Russia presents herself as a firm defender of international law, on the basis of the statutes of the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Final Act. Closer cooperation with the EU in CFSP matters has to date been welcome by Russia, but this takes place on the basis of international rules, which she regards as a means of "overturning the present order, undermining the 'unipolar trend' and changing the distribution of power in the international system in favour of Russia" (Splidsboel-Hansen, 2002: 448) . Cooperation with the EU is therefore part of Russia's overall strategy in foreign policy to counterbalance the perceived unipolar structure of the international system and to detach the United States from the European security system. The selection of issues dealt with in EU-Russia common statements and declarations on matters, such as the Middle East conflict, terrorism, or the cooperation on political and security matters in Europe, illustrates this point.
In Both the absence of incentives and legitimacy explain Morocco's reluctance to establishing mechanisms for aligning with CFSP acts. The EU's lack of legitimacy appears to be the crucial factor in the sense that Morocco's foreign policy stances diverge substantially from that of the EU. This is reflected by, for example, the voting behaviour of Morocco at the General Assembly of the United Nations, which is considerably at odds with that of the EU 4 . Topics on the UN agenda that recurrently separate the EU and Morocco relate to the Middle East, Maghreb, and especially the Western Sahara, human rights, and democratisation. Given these fundamental 13 divergences, the potential costs of setting up a mechanism of alignment with CFSP acts would be much higher for Morocco than in the other cases, but also for the EU, as a high rate of non-alignment would visualise EU's lack of support from one of its closest partner countries in the Mediterranean. In view of that, the EU has opted in its relations with Morocco for a process of bilaterally-based convergence, where forms and institutions dominate over the substance of the relationship.
Control of the export of dual-use items in the context of non-proliferation of WMDs
Given that certain goods, technologies, and services have a dual use, in that they can be used both for peaceful purposes and to build weaponry, the EU has begun to establish an internal scheme to control the export of these items within and beyond the EU (Schmitt, 2000) . export controls aimed at combating proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as a security issue (as opposed to a commercial one). In sum, the EU has generally preferred basing policy convergence on international rules, instead of promoting its own intra-EU policies. Nevertheless, these international rules are supplemented with bilateral ones in the case of Russia and with EU ones in the case of Ukraine. These differences are also consistent with our explanation of the factors at stake during the process of rule selection.
As said, Russia is a special case when it comes to non-proliferation efforts. The EU-Russia Road Map combines the reference to international rules with the will to develop them further bilaterally. Thus, both parties pledged to foster the "universal adherence to and greater effectiveness of the relevant international instruments" and the "enhancement and, where relevant, enlargement of export control regimes". At the same time, they agreed to set up a "dialogue on non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control, including regional aspects, for further convergence of positions and possible cooperation of activities within existing international mechanisms". In other words, the Ukraine accepts EU demands as legitimate and that EU legislative and administrative templates are welcome as models (Checheyuk, 2008) . However, independently from perspectives on prospective membership of the EU, there are also other incentives. As recognized in a report that compares Ukrainian and EU legislation in the field of export controls, "the wish for close economic and trade related ties with the EU is in itself a strong incentive for alignment and harmonisation of trade procedures with that of the EU" (Scientific and Technical Center, 2008) . Finally, Ukraine does not attempt to exert a decisive influence on international rules regarding the spread of dual-use items.
However, she demonstrates full compliance with them in order to deflect accusations of facilitating the spread of dangerous items and has a long record of defending stances that are fairly consistent with those of EU member states.
In the cases of Georgia and Morocco, the interest in the control of the export of dual-use items is less pronounced, given that both countries' capabilities with respect to WMD are considerably less than those of Russia and Ukraine. As a result, policy convergence has been structured only around general provisions that may be derived from international rules, since such provisions may constitute a normatively neutral ground (thereby providing a cloak of legitimacy) for cooperation. Consequently, the bilateral documents agreed with Georgia and Morocco include similar provisions about establishing (Morocco) or developing (Georgia) an effective system for national export controls that will cover the export and transit of WMD-related goods, including the control of the end use of dual-use technologies with respect to their potential to be used in WMDs, as well as effective sanctions for breaches of export controls, using UN Resolution 1540 as a basis. Morocco was also invited to participate in the EU Outreach
Project, but the scope of the cooperation within this project is much narrower than that with Russia and Ukraine.
Crisis management operations
Crisis Morocco has been indeed one of the most cooperative partners in the Mediterranean Dialogue, taking part in many of its training and modernisation programs and even in NATO led missions, such as the KFOR (Benavides Orgaz, 2007: 23-29) . With respect to legitimacy, an important element in Mediterranean countries' reluctance to participate in the ESDP is that most of the missions are not sanctioned by a clear mandate from the UN. In addition, differences in the political assessment of certain crisis and criticisms towards asymmetrical designs for cooperation have remained common in the Mediterranean countries (Boguslawska, 2008: 4) . In fact, the development of the ESDP was always regarded with distrust by southern Mediterranean countries in general (Balfour, 2004: 15) . (Gomart, 2008: 14) . On the other hand, Russia has expressed her opposition to ESDP operations in regions adjacent to EU and Russian borders. In this sense, Russia is keen on emphasising the role of regional organisations, such as the OSCE, in crisis management.
Finally, in the case of Georgia, cooperation is to be based on bilaterally- 
Conclusions
EU policy towards its neighbourhood area has increasingly been analysed in terms of the process by which the EU responds to external challenges by attempting to expand its own system of governance beyond its member states. In the above discussion, we have broadened the scope of the debate by arguing that the EU can promote policy convergence, rather than the unilateral transfer of rules, using rules other than the EU's.
More specifically, the EU promotes policy convergence on the basis of international and bilaterally-developed rules.
Each kind of policy convergence corresponds roughly to one third of the case studies, though there are instances of combined rules. This fits the idea proposed at the beginning of the article that the conditions that make convergence based on EU rules possible (in terms of incentives and legitimacy) are not all-pervasive. It is also interesting that Ukraine (where the EU's incentives and legitimacy score high) is the neighbouring country in three out of four of the cases of EU-based convergence. Here, the overarching disposition to further integrate with the EU underlines the relevance of process-related considerations. Conversely, when EU rules are perceived as less legitimate than international ones, the latter are selected as the foundation for convergence. For example, though Russia is interested in cooperating with the EU in foreign policy field to foster multipolarity, it denies the EU authority to act as a rule maker in this domain. International-based convergence is also prevalent in the control of the export of dual-use items, despite the fact that measures for control are strongly legalised in the EU as part of the first pillar, because EU rules themselves are embedded in an international regime that is widely perceived as legitimate. Finally, when the EU does not have the incentives or bargaining power to promote its own rules, bilateral rules are developed. Normally, the setting of bilateral rules for convergence is related to the lack of bargaining power on the part of the EU, as in the case of cooperation with Russia and Morocco in crisis management, but the EU can also be uninterested in offering stable schemes to neighbours, as with Georgia on this same issue. Sometimes, there is little mutual perception of legitimacy and little bargaining power. In this case, rules can be selected by any of the available courses of action and this selection needs to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. However, the empirical evidence suggests that mixed solutions can be expected that combine bilateral and international rules. Table 1 shows the presence of some interesting patterns, both sector-and country-driven. For instance, Russia and Morocco are less prone to participate in EUcentred policy convergence (with no instances in our case studies). In addition, with respect to the control of the export of dual-use items, convergence seems to be based on international rules (sometimes combined with other rules). We think that the systematic replication of this approach in a broader range of areas would allow the emergence of a more complete account of the EU as a regional actor and the patterns of inclusion/exclusion that it is promoting.
Our cases do not allow us to take a stance in favour of any of the analytical approaches presented in the introduction to this special issue. Precisely, none of the central variables used in the analytical approaches is individually sufficient to account for the selection of rules for policy convergence in the CFSP; however, they all seem to be necessary. For example, institutionalist accounts do not explain why a powerless EU cannot promote convergence on the basis of strongly legalised and well legitimized EU rules. Similarly, the power-based approach cannot explain why bargaining power is not sufficient for EU-based convergence to take place when international rules are perceived as more legitimate than EU ones. In addition, if policy convergence and rule selection are processes in which both the EU and neighbouring parties play an active role, material and ideational factors need to be defined in a relational way, thus including the neighbours' domestic factors. Finally, the empirical evidence seems to suggest the existence of a certain correlation of power and legitimacy that is worth paying attention to in further researches.
To conclude, we have found no empirical reason to maintain the tendency to exclude CFSP issues from analyses of external governance. In this area, the EU is far from being a traditional foreign policy actor. On the contrary, the EU has the explicit will to promote policy convergence (whatever the normative foundation of this process might be) and to expand the regulatory and (sometimes) the organisational boundaries of the EU. This is precisely as the literature on external governance would have it. 
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